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Abstract 
Changes in international trade agreements while retaining protectionist sugar policies have led to 
the opportunity for confectionery manufacturers to relocate to take advantage of favorable 
international trade policies.  Results suggest that NAFTA did not have a significant impact on 
location decisions of confectionery manufacturers in the U.S.   
 
Introduction 
The U.S. sugar program is one of the most debated and studied pieces of American agricultural 
policies (e.g. Beghin, El Osta, Cherlow, and Mohanty 2003; Moss and Schmitz 2002; Rendleman 
and Hertel 1993).  Disagreement exists between the sugar producers and industrial users of 
sugar, specifically the confectionery industry, on the impact of sugar policy on prices.  More 
detailed discussions of the U.S. sugar program as well as the industry in Mexico and Canada may 
be found in Alvarez and Popolous (2002) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (2001).  
One of the primary tools used in these studies is general or partial equilibrium modeling to assess 
the welfare gains (or losses) to the U.S. economy from changing U.S. sugar policy.  However, 
impacts on actual location and employment of confectionery manufacturers in the U.S. have not 
been frequently analyzed.   
  International agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have altered the trade flows of 
confectionery products due to the reduced tariffs that were negotiated.  Figure 1 illustrates how 
  1trade flows were altered during the 1990s in part due to international agreements as Brazil was 
replaced by Canada and Mexico as the leading source of confectionery imports from the mid 
1990s through the present.  The confectionery industry is widely viewed as a “footloose” 
industry due to relocation being inexpensive as there is not a dominant cost factor (Connor and 
Schiek 1997).  Current Industrial Reports published by the Census Bureau show that nearly a 
fourth of the quantity of confectioneries consumed in the U.S. were imported in 2006 up from 
roughly 16% in 2001.  While not all of this surge in imports may not be a direct result of 
NAFTA (and CAFTA to a lesser extent), it shows how quickly sources of supply can change in 
such a short time span with a footloose industry.  Peter Buzzanell and Associates (2003) in a 
study commissioned by the American Sugar Alliance note that executives of many confectionery 
firms believe firm location will continue to move to areas where sugar costs and labor are 
cheaper than in the U.S. or Mexico such as Latin America, Brazil, or Argentina.   
  A recent publication by the Department of Commerce’s International Trade 
Administration (2006) estimated that for every job saved in the growing and harvesting of sugar 
in the U.S., three jobs were lost in the confectionery industry.  This estimate was based on press 
clippings from the 1990s that documented the closing of confectionery factories throughout the 
U.S.  This report admits that it may have underestimated the total number of jobs lost due to U.S. 
sugar policy which has remained largely the same since the 1990s.  Jusko (2002) and Napolitano 
(2004) further discuss plants that have closed operations or relocated across international borders 
to take advantage of sugar policy and international trade agreements.  Despite these reports, 
apparent domestic production of confectionery products has increased in the U.S. over the past 
five years despite an increase in imports (U.S. Census Bureau). 
  2  The combination of a protectionist U.S. sugar program through its use of marketing 
allotments and loan rates in conjunction with NAFTA has not caused the loss of the 
confectionery industry in the U.S.  However since the confectionery industry is footloose, 
confectionery manufacturers could be taking advantage of location opportunities that did not 
exist prior to the adoption and implementation of NAFTA and continuation of the U.S. sugar 
program.  Hanson (1998) states that “as NAFTA consolidates the process of USA-Mexico 
economic integration it is likely to contribute to further relocation of US production towards US 
cities on the Mexican border.”   
  This paper uses a location model to analyze growth patterns in the confectionery industry 
using county and state level data from 1993 to 2005.  This time frame allows for changes in 
location to become evident due to the long-term nature of plant investment decisions.  Data from 
the Census Bureau’s County Business Pattern data is used which allows for analysis of segments 
of the confectionery industry including chocolate and non-chocolate confectionery.  Similarly, 
the relatively unchanged nature of sugar policy in the U.S. will allow comparisons of results to 
previous studies of the confectionery industry such as Goetz (1997).  Although this modeling 
method will not definitively prove if NAFTA had an impact on location decisions, the 
importance of counties that border Canada or Mexico along with access to interstates will be 
measured and serve as a proxy.  Traditional factors that attract footloose industries as outlined in 
Goetz (1997) and Henderson and McNamara (2000) have likely not changed, though access to 




  3Literature Review 
Readers interested in U.S. and world sugar policy are directed to Alvarez and Popolous (2002), 
U.S. International Trade Commission (2001) and Peter Buzzanell and Associates (2003) for 
background on U.S. sugar policy that is omitted here.  Concerns about U.S. confectionery 
manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive in the export market led to the establishment of the 
Sugar Containing Products Re-Export Program (SCPREP) in 1984 which allows for world-
priced sugar imports to be used in the production of goods that are destined for the export 
markets.  However, any products produced in the U.S. that are intended for the domestic market 
must contain domestic sugar.   
  Like the U.S., Mexican sugarcane production is highly regulated and producers receiving 
a price for their sugar approximately two and one-half times the world price for raw sugar.  
Canada is the only North American market that does not have protectionist policies for sugar 
beet producers and has no import restrictions on raw sugar and minimal duties on refined sugar.  
Like the U.S., the Mexican PITEX and Maquiladora programs act in a similar fashion to the 
U.S. SCPREP.  The Mexican programs allow for confectionery manufacturers to benefit from 
savings in labor, energy, and sugar costs that Mexico can offer to firms relative to the U.S.  A 
breakdown of the cost savings between firms operating in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. can be 
found in Buzzanell and Associates (2003).   
  With transport costs being relatively unimportant for footloose firms, Alonso (1972) 
states that one of the three mechanisms that can make these types of firms more footloose is a 
decline in the relative prices of transported inputs.  Such a reduction occurred with the signing of 
NAFTA as Mexico was granted a declining tariff schedule for sugar through 2008 when these 
rates would become zero in addition to having no limit on the amount of sugar that can be 
  4exported to the U.S.  While the reduction in cost of sugar because of reduced tariff rates is not 
sufficient to overcome other labor and energy cost advantages Mexico has, the reduced cost of 
Mexican sugar may spark relocation plans among confectionery manufacturers internally in the 
U.S.   
 
Methodology  
Industrial location decisions are often viewed as a two-stage process with each stage being 
independent of each other (Goetz 1997; Henderson and McNamara 1997 2000; Blair and Premus 
1987; Alonso 1972; and Woodward 1992).  The initial step is to select regions for consideration 
with the second step to select certain areas for consideration in the final location decision.  The 
first stage sees regions selected that will help the firm achieve its investment criteria including 
proximity to “raw materials, entrance into product markets, or increase market share” 
(Henderson and McNamara 2000).   
Once those regions have been selected, the second phase of the decision process occurs.  
Much effort has focused on the factors affecting the decisions that attract manufacturing firms to 
a given location (whether food or non-food).  The industrial location literature suggests that the 
final location decision is described in the following process where CMj = f(M, L, I, A, F) where 
CMij is the number of confectionery manufacturers in county i, M is a vector of market factors, L 
is a vector of labor market characteristics, I is a vector associated with  infrastructure in county i, 
A is a vector of agglomeration economies, and F is a vector of fiscal polices.  The independent 
variables are included in analysis of location decisions regardless of whether the firm is supply 
or demand oriented or footloose, and would be necessary to ensure that a firm remains viable in a 
given county.   
  5Numerous approaches have been used in the location literature to determine the factors 
affecting firm location from the net growth model (Goetz 1997; Henderson and McNamara 
1997) to estimating the probability of location through a conditional logit (Woodward 1992; 
Levinson 1996) to count data models (Henderson and McNamara 2000; List 2001) to name a 
few.  Count data models (i.e. Poisson) have been used in a variety of applications including the 
number of defects in a manufacturing process, recreational demand literature, and firm location.  
One advantage the count data models have over conditional logit models in firm location studies 
is the fact that each choice becomes an observation in a large data set as the independence of 
irrelevant attributes (IIA) is not a factor (Guimarães, Figueiredo, and Woodward 2004).  Lambert 
(1992) was the first to use a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model which allowed for datasets that 
contained a large number of zeroes to be used, such as firm location decisions using counties in 
the U.S. as the dependent variable.   
The ZIP model is essentially a single hurdle model as described in Shonkwiler and Shaw 
(1996).  Consistent with the firm location literature, the ZIP model separates the decision process 
into a two-step process. The probability of a county having a confectionery manufacturer, Yi, is 
defined as 
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where yi is the number of confectionery manufacturers, Yi is a potential integer outcome, and 
E(Yi) = λi.  An underlying assumption of the above is that yi =  , or rather desired location is 
equal to observed location.  The term log (λi) = Xiβ which are the county specific characteristics 
*
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  6that affect the decision of whether or not to locate or retain a confectionery manufacturer in a 
given county.  This leads to the following sets of expressions adapted from Lambert (1992) and 
List (2001): 
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with the notation following from the above descriptions. 
  Two processes are at work in a ZIP model, the process that generates a nonzero value 
(the Poisson probability function) and the process that generates a zero value which is a logistic 
probability function in this empirical application.  The covariates used in each step of the 
regression may or may not be the same.  Some factors may not be important in the second stage 
of a location decision due to the assumption that sites in the final round of the decision process 
have already met threshold criteria used in the first round.  The parameters employed in the 
logistic function, p, is defined as logit(p) = log(p/(1-p) = Ziγ. 
  Count data models such as zero-inflated Poisson models are fixed effects models.  Hall 
(2000) demonstrated the addition of a random intercept to ZIP models.  The random effect was 
placed only in the log-linear regression model yielding the following equation: 
(5)  i i i b X σ β λ + = ) log( . 
In both Hall (2000) and this application, the random intercept, bi, is assumed to be an 
independent standard normal random variable.  The estimated likelihood function using a ZIP 
model with a random intercept is then: 
(6) 
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  7  The excess zeros in a zero-inflated model induce overdispersion especially with greater 
occurrences of overdispersion when the zero state (i.e. the logit regression) is more likely.  The 
occurrence of overdispersion is a result of the assumption that the Poisson mean is equal to its 
variance (Greene, 2003).  Care must be taken to ensure that the proper model (whether a ZIP, 
Poisson, or negative binomial) is used due to probability of overdispersion.  Lambert (1992) uses 
the estimated probabilities plotted against the empirical probabilities to determine which of the 
four types count models is most appropriate for the given modeling equation.  List (2001) uses 
the Vuong statistic to test for which type of Poisson model is most appropriate given that the ZIP 




The number of confectionery manufacturers in a given county was obtained from Census 
Bureau’s County Business Population dataset from 1993 to 2005.  This dataset breaks down the 
number of manufacturers by employment size and type of confectionery produced by SIC codes 
prior to 1997 and NAICS codes from 1998 to 2005.  Information on amount of sales was not 
available.  There were 3,080 counties in this dataset for the contiguous U.S. states plus the 
District of Columbia.  This provides 40,031 counties in the thirteen year period from 1993 to 
2005 with 7,047 (17.6%) of those counties having had at least one confectionery manufacturer in 
their borders.  The majority of those counties had only one manufacturer (3,980 total counties) 
operating during the thirteen year time period.  Of the 7,047 observations present, 6,863 counties 
had no more than 10 confectionery manufacturers present.   
  8The NAICS codes for confectionery replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
upon the implementation of NAFTA to allow direct comparisons among data originating in 
Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.  The chocolate confectionery code (NAICS 31132 and SIC 2066) 
is directly comparable across the time period studied in this paper.  The non-chocolate (NAICS 
31134) and purchased chocolate codes (NAICS 31133) are derived from the SIC code 2064, but 
the NAICS values are only within three percent of the SIC values.   
 
Independent Variables 
The regressors chosen are consistent with the location literature which states that location 
decisions are based on market factors, labor market characteristics, infrastructure, agglomeration 
economies, and fiscal polices.  Summary statistics, expected signs, and description of the 
regressors are provided in Table 1.   
Access to markets.  The market factors considered are the percentage of sugar produced 
in the county each year, the presence of a sugarcane or sugar beet refinery in the county, 
population, and per capita personal income.  The percentage of a state’s sugar crop produced in 
each county (SUGARPCT) was obtained from yearly Census of Agriculture estimates.  Although 
as stated previously, the confectionery industry is viewed as a footloose industry and is not 
directly tied to sources of raw materials such as sugar, this variable is included to determine if 
confectionery manufacturers are seeking areas that are close to areas of sugar production.  The 
presence of sugarcane or sugar beet refineries (CANEREFINE and BEETREFINE) from the 
Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns dataset were also included in the vector of market 
related variables as their presence in a county would further allow confectionery manufacturers 
access to sugar needed for their production of various types of candies.  An additional variable, 
  9NAFTA, was included to measure the impact of NAFTA on location decisions.  Attempts to get 
historical tariff rate quota (TRQ) information proved unsuccessful, so this variable counts the 
years that NAFTA was in effect.  The variable ranges from negative one (1993) to eleven (2005). 
  County population (POP) from the BEA REIS was also included in the market vector of 
independent variables.  Due to the County Business Patterns data including smaller 
confectionery manufacturers that likely produce candies for sale at their location, in addition to 
large multinational companies including Hershey’s and M&M Mars, these manufacturers must 
have sufficiently large potential market to tap into to ensure their viability.  An additional market 
variable included was personal per capita income (INCOME) from REIS.  This variable was then 
deflated by the implicit price deflator for GDP.  Income has been used to measure market 
demand and a proxy for quality of life in that county (Henderson and McNamara 1997 and 
2000).  A market potential variable (Plaut and Pluta 1983; Goetz 1997) has been included in 
some studies to measure the access to markets, but that is done at a state level due to the fact this 
is gravity adjusted across states and typically not counties.   
Labor force factors.  Labor characteristics included reflect the business climate in the 
states and counties.  Some data such as unionization and high school education rates were only 
available at the state level.  Labor unionization (UNION) rates were obtained from Hirsch, 
Macpherson, and Vroman (2001) which are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics publication, 
Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations.  It is assumed that the unionization in 
each county is the same as the state numbers.  The percentage of persons over the age of 25 with 
a high school diploma (HSED) is included to reflect the skill set of potential employees in a 
selected county.  Attempts to find rates at the county level were unsuccessful as these were not 
  10consistently reported across the study period.  This led to the state high school education 
percentages being used as a proxy.   
An additional labor characteristic included is the unemployment percentage rate in each 
county.  Unemployment percentages (UNEMP) were obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics.  These annual averages are available for every 
county in the U.S. dating back to 1990.  The average hourly wage rate was not available for 
confectionery manufacturers from governmental sources, but the manufacturing earnings (from 
REIS
1) of each county were used instead as a wage proxy (WAGE).  The wage earnings from 
food manufacturing would have been ideal, but disclosure rules prevented publishing of earnings 
in many counties, so total manufacturing earnings were used instead.  Values for each county 
were divided by one million and then deflated by the implicit price deflator for GDP to aid in 
scaling for the model.   
Infrastructure.  Many different variables have been used to measure the impact of 
infrastructure from port access to amount of road miles in a county (Henderson and McNamara 
1997; Henderson and McNamara 2000; Goetz 1997)  .  Lack of availability of data such as 
county road miles on a yearly basis led to the use of only the presence of interstates (as a dummy 
variable) in regards to transportation networks.  No new sections of interstate have been built 
since 1993 allowing no assumptions having to be made about the presence of interstates in a 
county from 1993 to 2005.  A dummy variable was also included that indicates if the county 
shares a border with Canada or Mexico.  Some counties in northern states including Maine, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin were included as border counties even if they did not 
have a land border with Canada due to access through either the one of the great lakes or the 
Atlantic Ocean in the case of Maine.  However, southern states such as Alabama, Florida, and 
                                                 
1 Values in REIS were in thousands (000s). 
  11Louisiana were not included as they do not share land border with Mexico or are in close 
proximity to Mexico. 
Agglomeration.  Although footloose firms are not tied to specific areas of the country in 
an effort to minimize costs associated with acquisition of raw materials or distribution of finished 
products, these types of firms may still choose to locate near other food manufacturers.  This 
would allow confectionery manufacturers to potentially reduce costs due to shared knowledge or 
a more skilled workforce due to the presence of other food manufacturers.  While the presence of 
other food manufacturers may cause firms to raise the wage of its employees, firms would be 
spending less on training employees due to the skill set already gained by employees.  The 
variable, FOODMFGS, represents all other food manufacturers in a county.  This is net of all 
other confectionery manufacturers in the county as well as the presence of sugarcane or sugar 
beet refineries.  These numbers are based on the SIC code 20 which represents Food and Kindred 
Products for 1993-1997 and NAICS code 311 (Food Manufacturing).  Additional dummy 
variables are included for regions of the country based on Census Bureau definitions.  The 
Census Bureau divides the country into four sections: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West.  
Inclusion of these regional dummy variables allows for the detection of differences between the 
parts of the country that may not be detected elsewhere including quality of life.   
Fiscal Policy.  Fiscal policies are included in the final vector in location study 
determinants, despite mixed results in terms of significance and direction.  Previous studies 
including Henderson and McNamara (1997 and 2000) used fiscal policy variables provided by 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) including tax capacity and tax 
effort.  However, the ACIR was closed in the late 1990s leading to no data from that time point 
forward being available.  Other sources for data regarding fiscal policy were available, but only 
  12aggregated for all counties in a state.  The Census of Government provides yearly fiscal data in 
terms of total collections from a wide variety of tax sources (i.e. corporate, alcohol, individual, 
motor vehicle, etc.) as well as total expenditures.  Data was not available on a state by state basis 
for 2001 and 2003, leading to the use of data interpolation in those instances.  Two ratios were 
created to determine the effect, if any, that fiscal policies have on location decisions by 
confectionery manufacturers.  The first ratio was the total property taxes collected by counties in 
a state divided by the total county level expenditures in that state.  Each component of the ratio 
was deflated by the implicit price deflator for GDP before calculating the ratio.  This ratio is 
similar to the one calculated by Goetz (1997) except that ratio was not aggregated for all counties 
in a state.  The second ratio calculated was the deflated corporate tax collections in the state 
divided by the deflated state expenditures.  This ratio relates how business friendly the state is in 
terms of corporate tax collections which were not available for all years in the study period. 
 
Empirical Results 
Empirical estimates of the zero-inflated Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
models are presented in Table 2.  Results were obtained by using the nlmixed procedure in SAS 
9.1.  First stage regression results (i.e. the logit model) are available upon request.  Signs of the 
estimates were generally as expected from location theory.  Akaike's information criterion (AIC) 
suggests that the ZIP model is preferred to the ZINB model.  More analysis is needed to 
determine the appropriateness of the ZIP relative to the ZINB model for this application.  All 
discussion of results refers to the ZIP model.  The coefficient estimates represent a percentage 
change in λ given a unit change in Xi.   
  13  Despite the confectionery industry being footloose, confectionery manufacturers tended 
to locate in or close to counties with sugarcane or sugar beet refineries.  This may largely be a 
result of counties having a significant population on which to draw their workforce as population 
(in thousands) was also highly significant.   Consistent with the food manufacturing location 
literature, the prevalence of sugar being produced in the county did not have a significant impact 
upon confectionery manufacturers’ location decisions.  Regional differences do exist in terms of 
locations decisions for the industry relative to the northeast.  These regional dummy variables 
were included to measure non-economic variables including quality of life.  Manufacturers were 
more likely to locate in counties that border Canada or Mexico.  It is possible that the SCPREP is 
effective in providing opportunities for confectionery manufacturers to remain viable.   
 The  NAFTA variable was not a significant factor in location of confectionery 
manufacturing firms.  Given that this was essentially a time trend variable extending from 1993 
to 2005, this may account for its lack of significance.  A more proper way to model the presence 
of NAFTA would be to include the amount of confectionery products allowed to enter the U.S. 
from Canada and Mexico duty free under the appropriate TRQs.  Even then, the NAFTA variable 
may remain insignificant due to the number of small confectionery manufacturers that are 
present in the U.S.  One unexpected result of this analysis was the relatively large negative sign 
of the FOODMFGS variable.  The initial expectation for this variable was to be positive as this 
variable was included as an agglomeration factor as food manufacturers might tend to locate near 
each other to benefit from potential synergies and experiences.  However, additional thought 
leads to the conclusion that the presence of other food manufacturers would lead to additional 
competition for employees, thereby increasing wages paid to employees by the respective firms.  
The WAGE variable was also significant with a different sign than expected.  This may be due in 
  14part to use of the all manufacturing earnings (food and non-food).  Such a finding leads to the 
belief that confectionery manufacturers tend to locate in areas where manufacturing is prevalent 
(regardless of type, food or non-food).  This may also reflect upon that a sufficient population 
base is needed to draw upon to have a confectionery manufacturer locate in the county. 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to determine how the confectionery manufacturing industry has 
altered location decisions from 1993 to 2005.  Counties in the lower forty-eight states plus the 
District of Columbia provided over forty thousand observations upon which to estimate a zero-
inflated Poisson model and zero-inflated negative binomial model.  Despite the possibility of 
overdispersion, results indicate the zero-inflated Poisson model is preferred to the zero-inflated 
negative binomial model.   
  Despite the protective measures that remain in place to ensure sugar production in the 
U.S. in the face of increasing trade liberalization including NAFTA, confectionery manufacturers 
were not adversely affected by the agreement from 1993 to 2005.  More refinement of the model 
is needed to ensure this result is not reflective of some variable the authors have not considered.  
Presence of other food manufacturing firms did have a significant negative impact on location 
decisions by confectionery manufacturers, suggesting that firms engaged in this industry face 
wage pressure from other firms due to the apparent skills that employees possess.   
  This paper measures location decisions by all confectionery manufacturers.  More 
analysis is yet to be done on specific sectors of confectionery manufacturers (non-chocolate 
versus chocolate) as well as employment size.  Research on these sub-sectors of the 
confectionery industry may result in findings that are masked by agglomeration of confectionery 
  15types.  Additionally, the small size of coefficients included in this model suggests that other, 
non-economic factors omitted are factors in location decisions.  This is possible due to many 
confectionery manufacturers being smaller firms.  Such a finding would suggest that the 
International Trade Administration (2006) estimates were correct in that larger manufacturers 
have already left the U.S. for more favorable business locations where U.S. policies (or lack 
thereof) are used against this country.  Smaller scale operations would be able to survive the 
implementation of NAFTA with a sufficiently large and loyal customer base due to the 
production of specialty products that larger manufacturers do not produce.  Recent consumer 
scares over the contents of foreign made products may yet lead to a revival of pride in purchase 
of products made in the U.S. which would further benefit domestic confectionery manufacturers.   
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a    Percentage of sugar grown    0.005 0.036  (-) 
CANEREFINE
b    Number of sugarcane refineries    0.006 0.088  (+) 
BEETREFINE
b    Number of sugar beet refineries    0.012 0.118  (+) 
POP
c   Population  (in  thousands)    89.900 292.503  (+) 
INCOME
c    Per capita personal income (in thousands)    0.220 0.546  (+) 
UNION
d,h   Unionization  rate    11.473 5.602  (-) 
HSED
e,h    High school graduation rates (% of persons 25 and over)    83.221 4.772  (+) 
UNEMP
c    Unemployment rate (% of workers)    5.594 2.599  (-) 
WAGE
c,i    Manufacturing earnings (in billions)    0.003 0.012  (-) 
HWY
f    Interstate highway (DV = 1 if highway crosses county)    0.443 0.497  (+) 
BORDER
f    County borders Canada or Mexico (DV = 1 if true)    0.051 0.220  (+) 
FOODMFGS
b    All other food manufacturers in the county    7.395 26.610  (+) 
NORTHEAST    County in Northeast     0.070 0.256   
SOUTH    County in the South    0.453 0.498  (-) 
MIDWEST    County in the Midwest    0.357 0.479  (+) 
WEST    County in the West    0.120 0.325  (+) 
PROPEXP
g,i    Property tax per general direct expenditures    0.246 0.081  (-) 
CORPEXP
g,h,i    Corporate tax per general direct expenditures    0.025 0.023  (-) 
NAFTA    Number of years into NAFTA agreement    5.000 3.742  (-) 
a Census of Agriculture yearly estimates 
b Census Bureau's County Business Patterns 
c Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
  
d  Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001) 
e Census Bureau County Population Survey 
f ESRI
 GIS Tiger File 
g Census of Government 
h Measured at state level 
i Deflated by the implicit price GDP deflator
  19Table 2.  Empirical estimates of the determinants of confectionery location 
   Model  type 
Variable   ZIP    ZINB   
Intercept   -0.9876***    -1.0892**   
   (0.3085)    (0.4082)   
SUGARPCT   -0.001    -0.00438*   
   (0.001855)    (0.002293)   
CANEREFINE   0.1055***    0.2073***   
   (0.03360)    (0.06724)   
BEETREFINE   0.4345***    0.1551*   
   (0.04381)    (0.07656)   
POP   0.000399***   0.000651***   
   (0.000022)    (0.000059)   
INCOME
a   0.03046***    0.03592***   
   (0.001037)    (0.002479)   
UNION   -0.00479*    -0.00549   
   (0.002486)    (0.003586)   
HSED   0.01109***    0.007425   
   (0.003473)    (0.004625)   
UNEMP   -0.01101*    -0.00786   
   (0.005970)    (0.009278)   
WAGE
a   0.01971***    0.008277   
   (0.003518)    (0.009026)   
HWY   0.6002***    0.4391   
   (0.03131)    (0.03767)   
BORDER   0.4456***    0.1157**   
   (0.02818)    (0.04703)   
FOODMFGS
b   -0.07473***    0.3182***   
   (0.01726)    (0.06147)   
SOUTH   -0.8989***    -0.9919***   
   (0.04547)    (0.06194)   
MIDWEST   -0.6652***    -0.709***   
   (0.02790)      (0.03973)   
WEST   -0.5003***    -0.475***   
   (0.03598)    (0.05234)   
PROPEXP
a   -0.01241***    -0.0139***   
   (0.001161)    (0.001698)   
CORPEXP
a   -0.02436***    -0.01583***   
   (0.004618)   (0.004281)   
NAFTA   0.01649    0.02138*   
   (0.009572)   (0.01151)   
Log-likelhood   -19280.5    -21589.5   
AIC   38639    43259   
a Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100. 
b Coefficient and standard error divided by 100. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 15, respectively. 


















































Figure 1, Quantity of Confectionery Imports. 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. 
 
  21